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Singapore experienced its first known Zika outbreak in 2016. Given the lack of
herd immunity, the suitability of the climate for pathogen transmission, and
the year-round presence of the vector—Aedes aegypti—Zika had the potential
to become endemic, like dengue. Guillain–Barre´ syndrome and microcephaly
are severe complications associated elsewhere with Zika and the risk of these
complications makes understanding its spread imperative. We investigated
the spatio-temporal spread of locally transmitted Zika in Singapore and
assessed the relevance of non-residential transmission of Zika virus infections,
by inferring the possible infection tree (i.e. who-infected-whom-where) and com-
paring inferences using geographically resolved data on cases’ home, their
work, or their home and work. We developed a spatio-temporal model
using time of onset and both addresses of the Zika-confirmed cases between
July and September 2016 to estimate the infection tree using Bayesian data
augmentation. Workplaces were involved in a considerable fraction (64.2%)
of infections, and homes and workplaces may be distant relative to the scale
of transmission, allowing ambulant infected persons may act as the
‘vector’ infecting distant parts of the country. Contact tracing is a challenge
formosquito-borne diseases, but inferring the geographically structured trans-
mission tree sheds light on the spatial transmission of Zika to immunologically
naive regions of the country.
1. Introduction
The tropical city-state of Singapore is home to the Aedes mosquitoes, Ae. aegypti
and Ae. albopictus, has local transmission of arboviruses such as dengue [1–5]
and chikungunya [2,6,7] and is at risk of outbreaks of Zika virus (ZIKV) [8].
The anthropophilic Ae. aegypti, in particular, is found—at low densities—in
close proximity to the human population, despite sustained elimination efforts,
including source reduction, traps that remove gravid mosquitoes, outbreak
investigations around clusters of cases, and public health education campaigns
[9,10]. The continued presence of Ae. aegypti has led to dengue being endemic in
Singapore, with substantial impacts on health and the economy [11].
As in many other metropolises, it is commonplace for residents to live and
work in different parts of the city. As a result, although vector-borne diseases
are geographically clustered, because of the localized presence of infected mos-
quitoes, humans may act as a conduit facilitating longer distance spread to seed
new foci of infection [12–14]. It is therefore vital to understand the contribution
& 2019 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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of both human mobility and the length of mosquito ranges to
arbovirus dissemination.
The Zika outbreak that was first identified in Singapore in
August 2016 provided a unique opportunity to illuminate the
geographical spread of a nascent arbovirus outbreak across
the city-state. Within several weeks of its first identification
within and around a construction site in the southeast of the
country, the outbreak had spread to multiple secondary loci
across many parts of the island [8]. Over the next month,
there were approximately 100 confirmed cases a week, of the
same order of magnitude as the four serotypes of dengue
[15]. Like the dengue viruses, Zika is transmitted primarily by
Ae. aegypti, and in consequence, there was, and remains, the
potential that the ZIKV could become similarly endemic. Auto-
chthonous ZIKV transmission is concerning, because of the risk
of severe complications including Guillain–Barre´ syndrome
and microcephaly [16–18], which, although not reported to
date in relation with ZIKV infection in Singapore, makes
successful control imperative.
As a legally notifiable disease in Singapore, the residential
and workplace addresses of confirmed cases of ZIKV disease
were collected by the Ministry of Health under the proviso of
the Infectious Diseases Act [8]. Despite the ongoing baseline
vector control programme that targetsAedesmosquitoes in resi-
dential areas, the outbreak demonstrates the possibility that
human movement may allow the virus to break the ‘cordon’
of vector control and lead to cross-island transmission. In con-
trast to dengue, which has been endemic in Singapore since at
least the 1960s [10,19], the 2016 Zika outbreak spread from
one initial locus and across a population that has heretofore
not experienced recorded Zika outbreaks; like dengue, it is
expected that there be relatively little seasonal forcing on trans-
mission risk [20]. Together, these characteristicsmake Singapore
an ideal model system to understand Zika transmission.
The objective of this study was to assess the contribution of
workplaces to the transmission of ZIKV infections during
the first wave of ZIKV in Singapore. To this end, we used
spatio-temporal models built using Bayesian methods to
comprehensively analyse the autochthonous spread of Zika,
exploiting the home andwork addresses and date of symptom
onset of 323 Zika-confirmed cases. To quantify the role of
workplaces to the transmission of ZIKV, we explored the
space of possible infection trees (i.e. who-infected-whom-where)
to infer how much infection, and how much transmission,
occurs around the home andworkplace of cases. This may pro-
vide valuable information to guide vector control efforts for
future outbreaks both in Singapore and elsewhere.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Zika case data
TheZikaoutbreak in Singapore resulted in 323Zika-confirmed cases
between Julyand September 2016 [8]. AsZika hadbeenmade a noti-
fiable disease, attending physicians were required to notify the
Ministry of Health for all cases. Under the auspices of the Infectious
Diseases Act, the residential and workplace addresses, and date of
symptom onset, were recorded for these confirmed cases.
2.2. Public transport data
Public transportation is themost commonmode of transport of the
residents of Singapore [21]. There are three main modes of public
transportation in Singapore: the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT), the
Light Rail Transit (LRT) and public buses. To pay the public
transport fares, most commuters use an EZ-link contactless card:
a smart card that is read when entering or leaving the MRT or
LRT network or when boarding or alighting a bus. Using data
on all users of EZ-link cards over one month from the Land Trans-
port Authority of Singapore, which captures the time and location
of commuters’ intersecting with the public transport system, we
identified individuals who visited within a 1 km square centered
on the initial focus, and for each inferred a plausible home address
and a plausible work address too using the algorithm described in
the electronic supplementary materials. We then discarded those
with neither an inferred home nor work address within that
1 km square and summarized the distribution of distances
between the addresses of those remaining.
2.3. Spatio-temporal model
We developed a spatio-temporal model using the residential and
workplace addresses, and date of symptom onset (as a proxy for
time of infection), of the 323 Zika-confirmed cases between July
and September 2016 to estimate the source of infection for each
case using Bayesian data augmentation.
While contact tracing is possible for diseases like severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS) [22], it is a challenge for vector-
borne disease as we are, obviously, unable to contact trace the
mosquitoes, and as a result we do not know the source of infection
for each case, i.e. the case infecting the mosquito infecting that case.
The location where the individual is infected is unobserved and
may often be their home or other places they spend significant
amounts of time, such as their place of work. In addition, there is
very little information available on those individuals who escape
infection altogether. Calculating the likelihood of the parameters
becomes challenging without knowing the extra information.
To address this uncertainty, we developed a Bayesian data aug-
mentation framework which considers the source of infection as
augmented data or nuisance parameters [23–25]. In this analysis,
the parameter space includes the unknown nature, location and
time of infection. Flat prior distributions were assumed for all
parameters (details in the electronic supplementary materials).
Assuming that Ij is the individual who infects individual j,
we denote hij to be the hazard of infection from a potential infect-
ing individual i to individual j, which is parameterized as
follows. The probability that i is the individual infecting j is:
Pr (Ij ¼ i) ¼
hijP
k:tk,tj hkj
,
where the time dependence of hij is suppressed for brevity and tk is
the day that individual k had the onset of symptoms. The hazard of
infection is assumed to be additive across sources and multiplica-
tive in time and space and, hence, the hazard can be written in
terms of the following spatial and temporal kernels:
hij / fT(tj  ti)[ fDkHi, Hjkþ fDkHi, Wjkþ fDkWi, Hjk
þ fDkWi, Wjk ],
where fT(d) ¼ 1=ds
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2p
p
exp {ððlog (d) mÞ2Þ=ð2s2Þ} (for d. 0
and 0 otherwise) is a time and fD(d) ¼ lexp(2ld) a spatial kernel
representing host and mosquito movement (for space) and incu-
bation (for time). It is worth noting that the temporal kernel
represents the convolution of extrinsic and intrinsic incubation,
and these are not inferred or modelled separately. We assume
that the hazard for the time between infections is proportional to
the lognormal density with mean m and standard deviation s on
the log scale, set to be consistent with the 10–23 days serial interval
range for Zika fever [26] as there was insufficient information to
directly estimate the temporal kernel from the data. Three fixed
temporal density were considered: lognormal(12,3), lognor-
mal(14,3) and lognormal(16,3); in addition a distribution with
free parameters, lognormal(m,s), was also considered. We
assume that the distances between infections have kernels
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proportional to the exponential density with rate l estimated from
the data. In this model, ti is time i had onset of symptoms, Hi and
Wi are coordinates of i’s home and workplace addresses, respect-
ively. The individual can be infected at home or work and can
infect others near his or her home or workplace. Lj [ fHj, Wjg is
the vicinity individual j was infected at and Sj [ {HIj , WIj } the
vicinity Ij infects j. Here, we also defined kLIj , Sj k to be the host
generation distance, namely the distance from where Ij was
infected to the location closest to where s/he infected j, and
kSj, Ljk to be vector generation distance, namely the distance
from the location Ij exposed j at to where j was infected. The
notation and terminology are represented in figure 1.
A custom-designed Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm
[23,24] was developed to allow for rapid mixing through the
joint posterior distribution of the parameters, which governs
both the spatial and temporal aspects, and the augmented
data. A standard Metropolis–Hastings step was implemented
to update the parameters [27,28] using a standard Gaussian pro-
posal distribution with bandwidth determined from pilot tests.
A Gibbs step was implemented to update the source of infection
for case i. The source (individual) must precede the new case and
is sampled with the proposal distribution with mass:
wi, j ¼
b fT(ti  tj) [ fDkHi, Hjkþ fDkHi, Wjkþ fDkWi, Hjkþ fDkWi, Wjk]P
k:tk,tj b fT(tj  tk)[ fDkHk, Hjkþ fDkHk, Wjkþ fDkWk, Hjkþ fDkWk, Wjk]
:
Here, fT and fD are taken to be proportional to lognormal and
exponential distributions, respectively, while b is a constant of
proportionality that cancels in the Gibbs step.
2.4. Estimation of infection tree—who-infected-
whom-where
From the spatio-temporal model, we inferred (i) Lj the location
where individual j was infected and (ii) Sj the potential source
which was seeded by individual Ij (i.e. Ij is the ‘human donor’
who infected the Aedes mosquitoes in the vicinity of j which
then went on to infect j ). With this, we estimated an infection
tree (i.e. who-infected-whom-where).
The majority of the ZIKV infections were not severe resulting
in ambulant infected individualswhomayact as the ‘vector’ infect-
ing distant parts of the country. Given the infection tree, we
identify several individuals whomay be responsible for spreading
Zika to immune-naive regions of Singapore. These individuals, or
super-dispersers, were the most probable donors who resulted in
the infection of other individuals at a relatively far distance
(beyond an arbitrary threshold u ¼ 15 km, corresponding roughly
to the 95th percentile of the cumulative distribution function
(CDF)) from where they were infected. Again, assuming Ij to be
the human donor responsible for infecting individual j, Ij was
responsible for seeding the source location of infection of individ-
ual j, Sj. The distance between Sj and the location at which j was
infected at, Lj, is given by kSj, Ljk and the distance between the
location where Ij was infected at, LIj , and the location at which j
was infected, Lj, is kLIj , Ljk. Individual Ij is identified as a super-
disperser if kLIj , Ljk  kSj, Ljk.u. For example, an individual
infected at work could infect mosquito(es) in his residential area
(formerly without an outbreak and distant from other potential
sources) which after several days results in the infection in other
individuals around that area. This individual would be flagged
as a super-disperser if his home andworkwere sufficiently distant.
Three variants of the basic model were developed—home-alone,
work-alone and home-and-work. The first two models consider only
home or work address, respectively, as a source of infection while
the third model considers both home and workplace as potential
sources of infection. Using the deviance information criterion
(DIC) [23], we chose themodel variant that best fits the data. To dis-
play uncertainty in the source of infection, we derive spatial
posterior density plots of the location of the source of infection for
each case, separately, using bivariate kernel density estimation on
theposterior samples of sources of infection. Theseposterior density
maps aggregate cases located close to each other in space, thereby
providing a fairer depiction of the uncertainty in infection locations
than an individual-based metric. The posterior distribution of the
CDF for thedistancebetweenwhere the inferreddonorwas inferred
tohave infected the recipient andwhere the recipientwas inferred to
have been infectedwasderivedbycalculating the empiricalCDF for
each iteration of the algorithm and aggregating over iterations to
obtain the posteriormeanand an equal-tailed 95%credible interval.
This was separately calculated for each temporal kernel, and for the
home-alone and work-alone variants of the model.
For each model, we ran the algorithm for 100 000 iterations
with every 10th iteration retained following a burn-in period of
5000 iterations. Convergence was assessed visually with trace
plots. The average computational time of a run with 100 000
iterations is approximately 3 h on a desktop computer.
We created a simulated outbreak on a spatial domain of radius
20 km, i.e. of approximately the surface area of Singapore’s main
island, Pulau Ujong, and we also built an individual-based simu-
lation model in which each member of the resident population is
represented by a line-listing, with home addresses assigned to resi-
dential addresses extracted from a geographical information
system (GIS) in-line with the number of residents by age and
gender in each subzone, an administrative division of Singapore
(described in the electronic supplementary materials).
The analyses and model building were performed in R [29]
and the geographical visualizations were done in R [29] and
QGIS [30]. Ethical approval was obtained from the National
University of Singapore Institutional Review Board.
3. Results
The spatio-temporal evolution of the outbreak depicted in
figure 2 shows how the initial focus within and around a
H1
W1 = S2
H2 = L2
W2
infection
infection
host
generation
distance vector generation
distance
Figure 1. Notation and model of host and vector generation distances. Individ-
ual 1 (red dots) resides at H1 and works at W1. She was infected in the vicinity of
her home and she seeds an infection (or a cluster, S2) near her workplace; this
represents the host generation distance. This cluster then infects individual 2
(blue dots) near his home, H2. This typically shorter distance is the vector gen-
eration distance. The host generation distance is typically longer than the vector
generation distance because humans may act as a conduit to longer distance
spread to seed new foci of infection. (Online version in colour.)
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construction site in the Aljunied neighbourhood (in the South-
east of the country and on the periphery of the downtown core
of Singapore) rapidly proliferated across the island over four
weeks [8]. This rapid dissemination coincided with the rela-
tively large distances between the homes and workplaces of
cases, with 25.4% of cases working at least 10 km from their
home (on an island that spans 50 km at its greatest extent);
this mirrors the relatively long distances travelled by commu-
ters working or living in the Aljunied area (figure 3), of
whom 14.0% travel more than 10 km to get to and from
work. A permutation test of median differences showed
some evidence that cases on average travelled further than
the reference group of people living or working in Aljunied
( p ¼ 0.01). Despite this, the distributions are qualitatively simi-
lar, which indicates that even if the initial focus had not been at
a construction site—leading to a substantial number of cases
being construction workers mostly living in foreign worker
dormitories on the other side of the island—there would still
have been considerable risk of secondary foci being seeded
far from the initial outbreak.
The posterior mean half-life distances between infections—
which represents a combination of human movement in the
vicinity of their home or workplace and of mosquito move-
ment over the incubation period—of the different models
fitted ranged from 430 to 560 m (figure 4). Some cases were
infected relatively far from where extant cases were
(figure 5d). Thus the inferred infection tree suggests that
several ambulant cases acted like long-distance vectors, or
super-dispersers, as they exposed distant and as-yet unaffected
neighbourhoods to ZIKV transmission.
A substantial proportion (64.2%) of ZIKV infections
occurred at workplaces (of the donor or recipient case, or
both), as seen from the estimated infection tree (figure 5a,b),
signifying the importance of not limiting control efforts to
week 1
nincident = 3 nincident = 6ninfected = 3
home of incident cases
workplace of incident cases
workplace of all infected cases
home of all infected cases
week 2
ninfected = 9
home of incident cases
workplace of incident cases
workplace of all infected cases
home of all infected cases
nincident = 111
week 4
ninfected = 147
home of incident cases
workplace of incident cases
workplace of all infected cases
home of all infected cases
nincident = 37
week 3
ninfected = 43
home of incident cases
workplace of incident cases
workplace of all infected cases
home of all infected cases
nincident = 159
week 5
ninfected = 287
home of incident cases
workplace of incident cases
workplace of all infected cases
home of all infected cases
nincident = 44
week 6
ninfected = 323
home of incident cases
workplace of incident cases
workplace of all infected cases
home of all infected cases
0 5 10
km
(a) (b)
(d)(c)
(e) ( f )
Figure 2. Spatial-temporal transmission of ZIKV infections in the first six weeks. Home (red and orange dots) and workplace addresses (light and dark blue dots) of
Zika-confirmed cases are geographically represented across Singapore. Recent weekly incident infections are enumerated for each week and emphasized by the
darker shades of red and blue. The cumulative number of infections each week is also presented. (Online version in colour.)
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rsif
J.R.Soc.Interface
16:20180604
4
the vicinity of residences of cases. The number of secondary
cases that resulted from the initial few cases was large but
as the outbreak progressed, the data suggested that the trans-
missibility had reduced (figure 5c). When we excluded
infections linked to the construction site at the initial epicen-
tre, 51.0% of infections occurred at either the donor or
recipient’s workplace.
Although the generation time distribution could not be
reliably estimated from the spatio-temporal data due to the
multiple overlapping transmission events, results were robust
to the generation time distributions assumed (the electronic
supplementary materials present alternative results). When
we considered a variant of themodel inwhich only one address
type was used, there was strong support in favour of the model
residential address
of Aljunied workers
workplace address
of Aljunied residents
people living or working
in Aljunied 2016 Zika cases
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Figure 3. Geographical distribution of residential and workplace addresses of
individuals working and residing 1 km within the epicentre of the 2016 Zika
outbreak. Euclidean distances between residence and workplaces, l2-norm,
were calculated for population (top right) and Zika cases (bottom right) resid-
ing and working in near the epicentre.
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Figure 4. Posterior mean infectious hazard as a function of distance, in kilo-
metres, between Zika infections. The solid lines indicate the posterior mean
hazards and the posterior mean half-life distances are represented by dashed
lines. A version in which the temporal effect parameters were estimated
directly is coloured red; other colours are for sensitivity analyses in which
time parameters were fixed at arbitrary values within the feasible serial
interval range of Zika fever. (Online version in colour.)
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Figure 5. Estimated who-infected-whom-where in the 2016 Zika outbreak in
Singapore. (a) The directed infection tree was estimated from the epidemio-
logical data. The cases could be infected at home (blue dots) and work
(orange dots) by the inferred donor. The donor can infect their secondary
cases near home (blue line) or work (red lines). (b) The bar chart of pro-
portions and 95% credible interval show that both home and workplaces
were essential to understand the Zika outbreak in Singapore. (c) The
number of secondary cases (grey dots are posterior median, and the grey
lines depict the 95% credible interval) determined from the estimated infec-
tion tree was calculated over time. These dots are plotted on the day of
symptom onset of the infector and the multiple dots on the same day implies
multiple infectors (jittered for visual clarity). The loess-smoothed mean
number of secondary cases are plotted in red (the 95% confidence interval
shaded in pink). (d ) Euclidean distance, l2-norm, between case and donors at
infection were compared against the infection sites of donors and cases.
(Online version in colour.)
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which considered both home-and-work addresses compared to
the home-alone or work-alone models (DIC tabulated in table 1),
thus indicating the role both locations play and the importance
of considering both location types for vector control efforts.
All variants of themodel support the finding that the reproduc-
tion number reduced from 5 or more in the early period of the
epidemic to below unity for cases with onset after mid- to late-
August, i.e. that secondary cases fell a few weeks thereafter.
Although the cause of the reduction cannot be determined by
the model structure, this coincided with the beginning of
vector control targeting the outbreak site around the end of
August 2016. Although the models in which the parameters
of the time kernel were fixed led to similar numbers of second-
ary cases, that of the model in which the time kernel’s
parameters were left as free parameters exhibited a profile
that was qualitatively different.
The posterior density of the estimated location of infection
for each case for the models with various temporal kernels is
presented in the electronic supplementary materials. These
demonstrate, as with the number of secondary cases against
time and general network topology, that the source of infection
is relatively robust to the specification of the temporal kernel
within the range of kernels considered. These spatial figures
also demonstrate that for most cases, the source of infection
can be inferred to a relatively limited set of potential foci. The
fraction of infections attributable to transmission events at
each combination of the donor’s and the recipient’s home
and work was consistent across the parameters considered
for the temporal kernel (electronic supplementary materials).
In the early phase of the outbreak, most infections were esti-
mated to have occurred near the case’s workplace, with
approximately equal numbers of infections at home and at
work in the second half of the outbreak (electronic supplemen-
tarymaterials). These results were robust to the temporal kernel
considered. The posterior CDF between infections is presented
in the electronic supplementarymaterials for different temporal
kernels and the model variants in which transmission is
allowed to occur only near homes or only near workplaces.
This shows that the inferences on the spatial signature are
robust to the time kernels and that substantially more longer
distance infection events are required to explain the outbreak
if it is assumed that only homes or only workplaces are
responsible for transmission.
Despite knowing approximately 20% of the actual infec-
tions in the simulation exercise, the inference performed
well to infer the location of infection of the infected cases
(electronic supplementary materials).
4. Discussion
Shoe-leather epidemiology to trace the route of transmission
between cases of a mosquito-borne disease is challenging, as
there may be no discernible links between cases separated
by one human–mosquito cycle of transmission. Statistical
methods first developed during the SARS epidemic [31] are
capable of inferring transmission trees but need to account
for geographical structure for vector-borne diseases, in which
the vector has a considerably shorter range than does the
host. The method presented in this paper is an extension of
the transmission tree reconstruction methods as described by
Wallinga & Teunis [31] that extends their temporal kernel, rep-
resented by fT(d) in our paper, to account for space, through a
spatial kernel fD(d), and by considering two main location
types for each case, namely their home and workplace.
Although the locations of cases by themselves make a convin-
cing case for the role of humans as a ‘vector’ transmitting the
virus to naive regions of the city, this extension to the Wallinga
and Teunis method allows the degree of such long-distance
spread, and the importance of the workplace in transmission,
to possibly be quantified. Although applied to a specific out-
break, the method could potentially be useful in other
settings, in particular, when the amount of genetic variability
is insufficient to allow transmission trees to be inferred using
phylogenetic methods.
Because ZIKV infections, in common with other arbo-
viruses such as dengue, are predominantly clinically mild
[8], infected hosts may not be isolated from the vector, and
through their continued mobility may disseminate infection
far from their home, or from the location they were infected.
The potentially high fraction of such ambulant, subclinical
infections may lead to delays in the identification of new
foci of infection. Moreover, in an urban outbreak like this,
the distance from home to work may be large relative to
the scale of transmission and, as a result, ambulant infected
persons may act as the ‘vector’ infecting distant parts of the
country [12–14], further complicating control. In this
analysis, we identified some individuals who could be
super-dispersers—or long-distance human vectors—for
ZIKV infection, and a key priority in future outbreaks
should be to identify such individuals early and ideally
isolate or protect them from being bitten by mosquitoes.
Such individuals are not unusual, as seen in the long tail
for commuting distances for people living or working near
the initial focus of the outbreak.
Conventionally, the residential address is the usual proxy
for the location of infection in spatial analyses [32], but this
study identified workplaces as a substantial source location
for transmission. Across all the models presented, the pro-
portion of infections occurring around workplaces was
substantial. The results represented in figure 5b,c provide
some empirical evidence that the national vector control pro-
gramme should consider both types of location (home and
workplaces) when defining clusters for interventions. As a
substantial proportion of infection occurs at workplaces, con-
trol measures targeted at residential regions of the city-state
Table 1. Deviance information criterion (DIC) of the models.
model
deviance information
criterion (DIC)
T  logN(12,3) home-and-work 6002
home-alone 6214
work-alone 6213
T  logN(14,3) home-and-work 6136
home-alone 6414
work-alone 6413
T  logN(16,3) home-and-work 6286
home-alone 6577
work-alone 6577
T  logN(m,s) home-and-work 5158
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may be ineffective to contain the spread of an arbovirus out-
break. In the past, vector control measures concentrated on
residential areas, although the national vector control pro-
gramme now considers both types of location in defining
clusters for interventions. Substantial amounts of infection
occurring at workplaces will make a control programme
that focuses on the home less effective, and as a result, the
method developed in this study may potentially better
inform vector control measures. Given the endemicity of
dengue in Singapore, it would be of some interest to investi-
gate the degree to which dengue infections occur away from
the home, especially in the light of previous research which
showed infection risk varying over a weekly cycle [33].
The methods described in this study met with several
challenges. Neither the exact location nor the time of infection
of the cases was known, and to overcome this, we used the
residential and workplace addresses and date of symptom
onset as proxies of place and time of infection. Transmission
in the neighbourhood of the home or workplace is implicitly
captured through the dispersal kernel, but it is a limitation
that other locations frequented by cases (such as eating
houses or places of worship [34]) could not be recorded.
Owing to the non-negligible asymptomatic rate of ZIKV infec-
tions, we may have incomplete information on potentially
infectious individuals despite the good surveillance system in
Singapore. A previous analysis of this outbreak sought to
infer the phylogeny of a fraction of the cases, but the low
mutation rate led to a lack of variation in the genetic data [8],
and as such, the epidemiological data provide greater infor-
mation on the transmission dynamics. Over a longer time
period, more mutations would be expected, and a marriage
of field and molecular epidemiological information may be
warranted for a longer outbreak [35–37]. Cross-immunological
effects have been demonstrated [38,39] between dengue and
zika, and it is not clear what effects this might have had on
transmission potential in Singapore, given the high prevalence
of dengue. In initial model building, we sought to specify
non-informative priors for the parameters of the temporal
kernel, but there was insufficient information to allow these
to be estimated togetherwith the other estimands.We therefore
set biologically plausible values of these parameters and
assessed the sensitivity of the results to the values chosen.
The main findings—in particular, the role of workplaces in
transmission and the inferred locations of infection—were
robust to this choice.
This study is both important epidemiologically—indicat-
ing the importance of considering both residential and
workplace addresses to inform the vector control measures
for diseases like Zika and dengue—and involved new meth-
odological development to tease out the multiple spatial
patterns driving this urban outbreak. Incorporating spatial
data in the model allows us to study the geographical-related
exposures for these vector-borne diseases. Singapore’s out-
break appears qualitatively different from those in less
urbanized environments [40–42], in that infected Aedes
mosquitoes played a less significant role in the long-distance
transmission of Zika than did ambulant cases, which may
have implications for control of subsequent arbovirus
outbreaks in urban settings like Singapore.
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